May 29, 2007
Parents Have Independent, Substantive Rights Under IDEA: Winkleman v. Parma City School District (Part 3 of 3).
On May 21st, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in Winkelman v. Parma City School District. The court held that IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights (beyond mere procedural matters) regarding entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their children. (Readers may find the syllabus, opinion, and concurring opinion of the case at the website of my alma mater. The syllabus is not part of the opinion, but merely a summary for readers’ convenience.) In this post, I will analyze the minority (both concurring and dissenting) opinion.
The Court faces two issues in Winkelman:
1. Does IDEA grant parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their children?
2: Does IDEA entitle parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se?
The majority, in an opinion from Justice Kennedy, concludes that “Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.†Because the majority finds that parents have independent rights entitling them to proceed pro se, they do not address the second issue (can parents litigate their children’s claims pro se).
Justices Scalia and Thomas conclude that (1) IDEA grants parents only independent procedural rights at the administrative stage, (2) but that those independent procedural rights would enable parents to proceed pro se in federal court for reimbursement of private tuition and for violations of administrative rights. For this reason, Justice Scalia’s opinion is both a dissent and a concurrence: Scalia and Thomas reject the means by which the majority allows parents to recover, but would recognize some right of recovery on more limited means.
Justice Scalia sees in IDEA a clear limit on how parents may proceed on their own behalf, with procedural and administrative rights for parents, but substantive rights – that is, whether the child received a free appropriate public education – residing with the child only.
It’s hard not to read this opinion and see how out-of-touch Scalia has become. Most parents – far more than merely parents of autistic children – would be surprised that Scalia thinks that parents would not have a direct, substantive interest in a free, appropriate public education for a child. When Scalia writes that keeping pro se cases from clogging the federal docket is a positive consequence of his analysis, he ignores the kind of cases he would be keeping out: parents trying to assert rights regarding their disabled children’s education. Scalia contends that there is a difference between interests and rights, but here his argument will fall on deaf ears; a parental right so closely allied to a child’s is one the majority of this country will recognize. The majority’s interpretation of the statute is likely closer to that of most Americans from across the political s spectrum.
Although Scalia still has some rhetorical fire (“The Court’s spraying statutory sections about like buckshot cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none existsâ€), his opinion in Winkelman is narrow, unsympathetic, and unlikely to be remembered. Scalia, himself, will be remembered as a consequential associate justice, but not for this minority opinion.
