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David G. Post, professor of law
at Temple University's Beasley School of Law, reviews Lawrence Lessig's
new book, Free Culture. A
draft of the review (purportedly to appear in the July issue of Reason
magazine), is available
(as a PDF file) at Post's website.
It is a timid, cowardly review that mentions a powerful critique
of Lessig, but mentions only; Post is too timid to apply the critique to
Lessig's new book.
(I do not know if Post's review
ever made it into Reason magazine; I cannot find mention of the
review on the Reason website, but in any event, my remarks apply
only to the draft review to which I link directly.
Post can hardly complain -- he has proudly displayed the draft on
his website.)
Post begins his review with a
description of Lessig: "Lessig,
a professor at Stanford Law School, has transformed himself from a
relatively obscure law professor toiling away in the academic vineyards
– highly regarded by colleagues, to be sure, but unknown by the world
at large – into one of the best known ‘public intellectuals’ on
the planet.”
I am sure that Post doesn’t
want to insult or irritate one of the best-known public intellectuals on
the planet, and with a fawning description like that, Post has no reason
for worry, and Lessig no cause for irritation.
(Lessig is hardly one of the best-known public intellectuals on
the planet, unless one believes that a few thousand lawyers, academics,
and readers of Wired magazine are a world unto themselves.)
Post knows, however, that Lessig
has a cause, or in Post’s way of describing it, a Cause.
Post tells us that in “Free Culture – his third (and, I
think, best) book – he [Lessig] shows his hand: He is summoning us to
the barricades. Rousing the
rabble. He has a Cause, and
he wants us to rally to it – to see how urgent a cause it is, and to
fight on its behalf.”
I imagine that if Lessig had
become one of the best-known public intellectuals on the planet before
his latest book, that Lessig would already have shown us his hand.
No matter – perhaps, Post had not previously seen the substance
of Lessig’s work, having been blinded by Lessig’s celebrity and
notoriety.
Post understands that “ [l]aw
professors, it must be said, do not ordinarily make good
rabble-rousers.” True
enough, but odd for Post to declare that “[l]aw professors, though,
serve the Goddess of Reason, alone, and she is, as the saying goes, a
jealous mistress.” I can
never remember being young enough to believe something like that, and I
would hope that no one who reads the review has ever been so foolish
either. If Post believes that law professors are devoted to the
‘Goddess of Reason,’ as though they were secular monks, he’s
deluded and self-aggrandizing; if Post believes that we’ll believe it,
then he thinks that we’re deluded, naïve, or stupid.
Post tells us that Lessig’s
“Cause is the protection of that imaginary piece of real estate known
as ‘the public domain’ and the ‘free culture’ has always, Lessig
argues, been built upon and interleaved with it – the culture of
transformative art, of sharing and borrowing and re-borrowing and
re-transforming…” ‘Transformative
art’: wonderful term for art, for those who want to seem to be more
specific, more versed in the deeper nature of things.
It’s just another empty phrase in search of a rationalized
meaning.
Post describes how Lessig
believes that an imbalance in copyright law, a “scheme for regulating
a small corner of the universe of creativity…has morphed into a system
under which (virtually) all creative output is subject to rights that
are (virtually) unlimited in scope and (virtually) perpetual in
duration. Just about every
bit of creative expression committed to paper or canvas or computer
screen anywhere on earth – every e-mail you right, every doodle on
your office notepad, every photograph you take or scan, or send to your
grandmother – is, under current law, protected by copyright.”
Even true, America is free, and
our culture vibrant. (Post
might also want to consider that almost everything I say or write is
subject to defamation law, but that hardly stops me, or others, from
saying all kinds of things.)
Note, too, that Lessig’s
celebrity rests on an attack on current copyright and the ownership
interest that it creates – that’s an easy case to make in academia,
where private property has few defenders, and free enterprise is
misunderstood, and deliberately, falsely maligned repeatedly.
Lessig, a professor at Stanford, requires no courage at all to
argue for a commons, where individual, private right is swept away in
the name of community needs. Small wonder that Lessig has become a
celebrity – to the extent that he has – by arguing for dragging
private ownership interests into the compost heap of the commons.
That’s an orthodoxy of Lessig’s environment, and he’s
merely publishing ideas that dozens of his fellow academics English
literature, sociology, art history, or gender studies espouse at parties
and rallies across campus. Advocacy
of private ownership and property would be the courageous position.
Post acknowledges, but timidly
refuses to consider, a powerful response to Lessig’s view that
copyright law has become s stifling restriction on the creation of
intellectual property. Post admits that "[t]his is, after all,
property that we’re talking about here; without property there can be
no markets, and robust free markets remain the bets way yet devised for
processing all the information about individual needs and wants and
translating that information into production and allocation decisions
regarding good and services. Copyright
law, in this view, is a wonderful, decentralized, property-creation
machine; everyone gets to ‘own’ his or her creative expression, and
to do with it (or not to do with it)
whatever he or she pleases.
The more, the better; the broader and deeper the scope of
copyright, the better the markets for creative expression will function,
and the better the markets for creative expression function, the more
creative expression we’ll get.”
(Post is wrong to call copyright
law decentralized – it is a uniform, Federal standard most often at
play, state copyright law provisions not withstanding.
It is individual, private creation that is decentralized,
as one would expect in a free market.)
Post concludes that this
‘libertarian’ and free-market view of copyright is “a respectable
opinion, and [Post is] not sure that Lessig has an adequate rejoinder to
it. Well, Professor Post,
does he – in your view – or does he not?
Before the celebrity intellectual, Post trembles, timid and
uncertain.
This is a powerful critique,
wholly for being right. Copyright
extends the power of property holding to all, and offers small and big
alike ownership and control over their own free expression.
From ownership, the right to sell, and the incentive to produce
still more, and better. No
property, no market; no market, no free profitable exchange; no free
profitable exchange, no lasting incentive to produce. Copyright has not
made American and the world less creative; copyright gives Americans the
incentive to produce more than ever before.
Post tells us that Lessig’s
“Free Culture, then, is not the final world on the
subject; there will be responses and debate, and counter-debate.” True, of course, but a disappointing recommendation, and
review. If Lessig’s work
is a mere starting-point, then Lessig has spent quite a bit of his
supposed notoriety and celebrity merely to begin something.
Even this beginning is more than Post can handle, and he shakes
before a celebrity’s mere start, unwilling to assess the critique that
would, fairly, expose Lessig’s rabble-rousing Cause as a misguided,
erroneous effort.
FRANK
GILBERT
JULY
6, 2004 |