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We
are deluged by theories, speculations, claims, and mere possibilities.
The most tenuous links, the thinnest bands, tie contentions
together. Entire
publications are built on this unsteady foundation. Americans, like all literate peoples, are surrounded by words
and the ideas they convey. Our
responsibility, however, is to consume, and produce, only the best from
the fare before us. So many
ideas, theories, and concepts, and from all of these only some can
command our scarce time. The
modern challenge for most isn't mere reading or writing; it's
distinguishing the good from the bad.
The
antidote for weak theories, flimsy contentions, and false claims is
rigor. Rigor is the use of
demanding and exacting standards. For
the law, it means command of fact, knowledge of law, and the application
of rational, logical principles of reasoning.
A
few, fundamental standards comprise rigor in legal reasoning: (1)
knowledge of law (substance, procedure, and jurisprudence), (2)
principles of logical reasoning, (3) an understanding of human nature,
from history, philosophy, and personal observation, (4) knowledge and
understanding of custom, (5) specific knowledge of other fields of
learning that a given legal question requires.
The
first, and most important, element of rigor in the law is a knowledge of
the law's substance, procedure, and jurisprudence. This is the
necessary, if insufficient, foundation of legal rigor. Fewer and
fewer are familiar with the substance (cases, statutes, regulations) and
procedures of the law. Every lawyer may know that there is a court
decision captioned Roe v. Wade, but few can accurately cite the
majority's holding. We may remember names, but the identifying
characteristics escape us.
Equally
significant is the jurisprudence that underlies substance and
procedure. I should, rightly, know the elements of a cause of
action for battery, and the procedures by which I may advance, or defend
against, that claim. Nevertheless, if I am to be a worthy
advocate, I need more: I should know something about the philosophy of
the law, the wisdom of it. (Every law should be able to ask: what
principle explains and justifies this recourse?)
Principles
of logical reasoning, applicable both to law and other fields, are vital
to rigorous legal argument. Kingsfield, the formidable law
professor from The Paper Chase, told his students that they would
leave his class "thinking like a lawyer." I believe
that, for the most part, the task isn't to think like a lawyer, but
rather to think logically. Logical thinking, applicable to all
fields of learning, requires a grasp of logical fallacies. A good,
logical lawyer should be able to spot a bad, illogical argument.
The
third element of rigor in law is an understanding, gleaned from history,
philosophy, and observation, of human nature. We might argue about
whether there is, at bottom, something like human nature. If so,
we should part company now, because someone disputing the existence of a
fundamental human nature is simply in error. History, read with discernment,
affirms the contention that there is a fundamental human nature. Centuries
of observations confirm basic tendencies and dispositions common to humanity
across generations continents, and civilizations. Personal;
observation confirms the implications of history, if idiosyncrasies of
the observer, or the observed do not get in the way.
Rigor
in law also requires a recognition of a place's customs and
habits. We may either agree or disagree with these practices and
customs, but it's foolish and impractical to ignore their
existence. Many well-intentioned efforts fail for underestimating the
weight of custom. (The same is true, of course, of those who underestimate
or dent the existence of a basic human nature.) Ignoring customary
or natural obstacles only invites failure, or extreme and oppressive
measures to salvage an ill-conceived plan.
Legal
rigor also requires that one understand something about the fields that
the law implicates. The best example is in patent law. A patent
lawyer without a working knowledge of the invention under consideration
is useless to his client. Patent law firms, typically and rightly,
expect their attorneys to have a knowledge of science and technology relevant
to their clients' inventions.
I
cannot say that this is all that legal rigor requires, yet even this brief
list presents a daunting challenge. Standards of excellence in
legal reasoning are no easy thing; even diligent, consistent efforts
produce only a fraction of all that one might achieve. This is a
case, however, where something is truly better than nothing, for ourselves,
our clients, and our society.
FRANK
GILBERT
APRIL
16, 2002 |